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Introduction
Avoidance is a core feature of anxiety (1, 2) and plays a central role in psychological strategies for the treatment of anxiety(3), but its underlying neural and cognitive mechanisms are unknown. Avoidance can be adaptive: if an individual perceives a situation as stressful then it makes sense to avoid that stressor in the future. However, excessive avoidance can result in a pathological downward-spiral. The more one avoids a situation, the less opportunity there is to learn that the situation is not as bad as feared, and a vicious cycle of avoidance and impaired extinction learning emerges, which in turn promotes further anxiety (1) . For example, an individual who fears social embarrassment might ultimately end up housebound, avoiding all social interaction.
The diathesis-stress model of mood and anxiety disorders (4) proposes that maladaptive avoidance should be greatest during periods of environmental stress in vulnerable individuals.
This idea has clear face-validity, and is supported by clinical anecdote, but is largely derived from retrospective, subjective self-report. This is because quantifying avoidance under stress in an experimentally controlled yet ecologically valid manner in humans is methodologically challenging. In this study we address this challenge using: i) a translationally-validated (i.e. comparable behavioral responses can be elicited across human and animal models(5)) 'threat of shock' procedure to induce stress (6, 7) ; ii) a cognitive task that has been shown to reliably index avoidance behaviour in healthy individuals (1) ; and iii) a computationally precise method of defining of avoidance.
Specifically, we operationalize avoidance as a behavioural bias towards withholding action ("nogo", i.e. inhibition) in the face of potentially negative outcomes. This powerful prepotent reflexive (or Pavlovian) bias has been observed consistently in humans and animals (8) (9) (10) (11) and is so profound that it can disrupt instrumental goal-directed behaviour (8) (9) (10) (11) . This is known as Pavlovian-Instrumental transfer (12) , and we harness it here to measure the degree to which individuals rely on their prepotent avoidance biases. Given that both induced stress (13, 14) and pathological anxiety have been associated with increased inhibitory control, it seems plausible that a combination of stress and anxiety will increase reliance on Pavlovian inhibitory avoidance biases (15) (in contrast with depression alone which might plausibly be associated with reduced reliance on Pavlovian approach biases (16) ).
Reinforcement-learning algorithms can provide parameterizations of avoidance behaviour that offer insight into both optimal behaviour when set correctly (17) , and to dysfunction and pathology when set incorrectly (18) . Critically, reinforcement-learning models enable us to parameterize the influence of Pavlovian avoidance biases on task performance in a formal manner. A large body of work has applied these models to healthy humans (8) (9) (10) , and they form the basis of human-level artificial intelligence (17) , but to date they have not been applied to individuals with mood and anxiety disorders.
We therefore tested individuals with mood and anxiety disorders and healthy individuals completing an approach-avoidance go/no-go task under stress, which was induced by threat of shock. Avoidance was defined and parameterised within a reinforcement-learning framework.
We predicted that the disordered group would show high reliance on avoidance bias, and that this would be exacerbated by stress. During the safe block, the background colour was blue and proceeded by a 4000ms message stating: "YOU ARE NOW SAFE FROM SHOCK". During the threat block, the background colour was red and the message: "WARNING! YOU ARE NOW AT RISK OF SHOCK" was presented for 4000ms. Participants were told that they might receive a shock only during the threat condition but that the shocks were not dependent on their performance. In practice, a single shock was delivered at a pseudorandom timepoint during one-third of threat blocks (a total of four shocks across 480 trials). Note that it is the anticipation of these shocks, not the shocks themselves that constitutes the manipulation (see supplemental analysis). At the end of each experimental task, participants retrospectively rated how anxious they felt during the safe and threat conditions on a scale from 1 ("not at all") to 10 ("very much so").
Materials and Methods

Participants
Approach-Avoidance Task
The task was based on the design of a previous probabilistic go/no-go reinforcement learning task (10, 20) modified to incorporate the threat manipulation. The prepotent Pavlovian bias to a win is a go response (approach) and the prepotent Pavlovian response to a loss is no-go (avoid). As such, the task comprised four experimental conditions where action (go/no-go) was crossed with valence (reward/punishment): 1) go to win reward (GW), 2) go to avoid losing (GA), 3) no-go to win reward (NGW), and 4) no-go to avoid losing (NGA). On each trial, participants were presented with one of four fractal cues per condition, followed by a target detection task, and subsequently by a probabilistic outcome (Figure 1 ; more task detail in supplement).
Reinforcement-learning models
Reinforcement-learning modelling proceeded in the same way as described in a prior paper (10) .
Briefly, we built seven parameterized reinforcement-learning models to fit to the behaviour of the subjects. All models were adapted Rescorla Wagner models. We use the term 'Standard' to denote the 6 parameter winning model from Guitart-Masip, et al. (2012) and either add or subtract parameters to test model fits for seven separate models (See Table 1 for a parameter specification summary).
Learning models: All the models assigned a probability to each action a t on trial t based on an action weight and the current stimulus. The action weights were constructed according to a 
Observation model: For action selection, the probability of each action was passed through a squashed softmax function with the addition of an irreducible lapse parameter (referred to as 'noise' in earlier papers, but renamed lapse here to avoid confusion with temperature noise parameters), which was free to vary between 0 and 1.
Parameter Estimation
We used an hierarchical Type II ML expectation-maximization (EM) procedure to fit the parameters across all subjects and conditions. These procedures are identical to those used by 2) Two distributions: one distribution for threat and one distribution for safe. This fitting procedure was blind to the existence of group.
3) A single distribution for all participants and conditions (i.e. each participant was included twice within the distribution; once for the safe, and once for threat conditions). This fitting procedure was blind to the existence of both group and threat condition, and serves to pull all parameters closer together.
4) Two distributions: one distribution for anxious individuals and one distribution for
controls. This fitting procedure was blind to the existence of induced anxiety.
The fit of each model and distribution was compared using the integrated BIC (iBIC). The iBIC is the integral of the likelihood function over the individual parameters (for details, see (12) The parameters recovered from the winning model were then compared across groups and conditions using two-tailed permutation tests implemented R coin (http://tiny.cc/o6brdy
IndependenceTest, oneway_test). The recovered p-values are comparable to those derived from standard t-tests, but do not require the assumption of normality (critical given the possibility of multimodal distributions recovered from the model fitting procedure).
Results
Basic analysis of symptoms and behaviour
As expected, the mood and anxiety group reported significantly higher symptoms of trait anxiety 
Reinforcement-learning model selection and validation
We fitted reinforcement-learning models to trial-by-trial choice behaviour using an hierarchical Type II maximum likelihood expectation-maximization approach (12 The hierarchical model fitting procedure requires the specification of population level priors. This raises an important conceptual question when it comes to considering multiple groups. Should we consider disordered and healthy groups as being sampled from the same or different populations? We answered this question through the adoption of a population-level model comparison approach. We compared fits for models ranging from four separate prior distributions for each group and stress condition (Figure 3a) to a single distribution for all subjects and conditions (Figure 3c) . The best fit for our winning model was achieved by fitting a single population distribution (Figure 3c ), implying that we did not obtain sufficient evidence to suggest that anxious and healthy individuals were sampled from different populations. Box plots and means of the posterior parameter distribution across subjects (under the Type II empirical prior) are shown in Figure 3f ; that all subjects share the same prior implies that the recovered parameters will be drawn closer together.
We next ran a posterior predictive model with parameters set to those from the winning model (i.e. having a computer make decisions as if it was each individual subject). Average parameters recovered from simulated data were close to those that were originally observed We finally performed permutation tests on the posterior parameters to assess the effects of group and threat condition. These revealed an increased reliance on the avoidance bias parameter in the disordered group (effect of group averaged across threat and safe): 
Discussion
Anxious individuals show strong avoidance behaviour that can be debilitating and selfperpetuating(1, 2). Here, using a computational approach, we provide evidence that mood and anxiety disorders are associated with increased reliance on an avoidance bias (a Pavlovian bias to withhold responding in the face of punishments) during reinforcement-learning. Moreover, consistent with the diathesis-stress hypothesis, this effect was exacerbated under stressful conditions in the disordered group only.
We provide a potential computational mechanism for this effect. We show that avoidance behaviour -which is currently measured by retrospective self-report -can emerge at the level of stimulus-action associations. Specifically, individuals with mood and anxiety disorders may show avoidance in the face of threats because they inhibit their action tendencies when faced with a perceived negative outcome. This is consistent with prior work demonstrating increased behavioural inhibition under stress (13, 14) , in pathological anxiety (15) and in high (non pathological) trait anxiety (22) (although see (23)). Over time, however, individuals may be ultimately able to learn to overcome this bias (i.e. promote instrumental override of Pavlovian bias parameters) if they are given the opportunity to experience outcomes (i.e., NGW go probability is lower at the end than GW here). However, in the real world, avoidance means that, by definition, predicted outcomes are rarely experienced and challenged, there is little opportunity to learn, and a persistent miscalibration can emerge.
The growing field of computational psychiatry (18) seeks to use theory-driven approaches to explain psychiatric phenomena. Testable theories are a pre-requisite to a clear mechanistic understanding: here, we have outlined a precise and formalised computational theory about how avoidance emerges in anxiety under stress. This approach has at least two further advantages. Firstly, it allows us to reduce a highly dimensional dataset (here, choices over time)
into small number of parameters that respect the temporal variability of the data (unlike responses averaged over time). Secondly, we can directly integrate this model into biophysically plausible models of underlying neural activity (24) . Indeed, performance of this task in healthy individuals has been linked neurocognitively to striatal and midbrain regions associated with network models of action(9, 10) as well as dopaminergic modulation of this circuitry (25) . Striatal regions of this circuitry are also modulated by the threat of shock technique used here (26) , providing a link between these substrates and stress. This computational approach therefore holds promise as a means of unifying complex psychiatric phenomena, such as avoidance, with their underlying neural circuitry.
Such a mechanistic link is critical if we wish to develop improved treatments. Without mechanistic understanding, treatment development has to be targeted at downstream symptoms -e.g. self-reported avoidance. The problem with this approach can be illustrated by the symptom of cough (27) . Lung cancer, allergies, bronchitis or tuberculosis all result in a cough through fundamentally different mechanisms, but the treatment for one will be ineffective for the others (and indeed may even cause harm through side effects). Targeting 
Limitations
While our model may provide a mechanism by which avoidance behaviour occurs in anxiety and depression, it does not provide a means of disentangling its relationship with specific constructs under the broad category of distress(30). Indeed, symptoms of anxiety and depression are highly co-morbid (mixed MDD and GAD is the most common diagnosis in our sample and our self-report measures of anxiety and depression are highly correlated), so future work is needed to delineate how, if at all, avoidance processes map separately onto feelings of anxiety or depression. In this study we did not find a reliable relationship between the avoidance parameter and self-reported anxiety symptoms using a dimensional approach (see supplement).
One potential explanation is that our self-report measures are not optimal for capturing the symptoms measured by our task. Self-reported avoidance behaviour might, for instance, show a stronger relationship with task performance It is also worth highlighting that that there is a difference between 'passive avoidance' and 'active avoidance', the latter being where an individual performs an action to avoid harm (i.e.
GA). There are clear individual differences in avoidance learning strategies(31), so reliance on active vs passive avoidance may differ across subgroups of anxious individuals. For instance, active avoidance may be especially prominent in PTSD(32), so an interesting question for future work is whether PTSD may be associated with corresponding improved GA performance and hence improved task performance.
Another important limitation is that, while it is possible to see evidence of the influence of the avoidance parameter when performance averages are divided into separate time bins (see supplement), our non-modelling analysis is inherently less sensitive to the avoidance effects because focusing on means reduces our sensitivity to detect effects that evolve over trials.
Finally, it should be noted that we use a Bayesian framework for evaluating model fit and then use a frequentist approach to compare output parameters. This approach asks whether parameters, which were fitted under a single distribution, actually come from separate distributions. This is highly conservative and will require large effects in order for differences to be detected. A better approach would be to test the effect of varying the population priors at the parameter level. In light of the present data, we would predict that avoidance bias would be best fit using multiple distributions, while all other parameters will be best fit under a single distribution. This would enable inference about group differences in parameters to be fully confined within the model comparison framework. We are actively developing tools that will enable this approach in the future. Relatedly, this is the first study using this task to report results for a model that includes separate avoidance and approach parameters. To the best of our knowledge this model has not previously been reported, and it is possible that it would also offer the most parsimonious account of other samples. However, it is also plausible that the addition of an extra parameter is only warranted in a sample in which this captures additional variance (as is the case here, being the only parameter that differs across groups). 
